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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court's order that reversed the
magistrate court's order denying Gaylord Jay Colvin's motion to suppress.
Correctly applying the law to the facts here, this Court should reverse the district
court's order and remand.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Colvin was pulled over by Officer Jeffory Talbott for failing to signal when
merging from an ending right lane into the remaining left lane while driving. (R.,
pp. 118-19.)

Officer Talbott had followed Colvin for about three or four miles

before stopping him. (R., p. 117.) During that time, Colvin's vehicle "weaved
within its lane at times," and "consistently traveled under the speed limit" - 30
mph in a 35 mph zone.

(R., pp. 117-18.) Officer Talbott was driving behind

Colvin in the left of two southbound lanes when Colvin signaled and changed to
the right-hand lane. (R., p. 118.) Officer Talbott remained in the left-hand lane.
(R., p. 118.)
Colvin passed a yellow, diamond-shaped traffic sign - in the right-hand
shoulder of the road- indicating that the right lane was merging into the left. (R.,
p. 118.)

Colvin "passed through the area where the two southbound lanes

converged and continued south in the single remaining southbound lane." (R., p.
118.) While he merged left- that is, while he "traveled through the area where
the two southbound lanes converged into a single remaining southbound lane" "Colvin did not use any signals." (R., pp. 118-19.) Officer Talbott stopped Colvin
1

"for failing to signal, in violation of I. C. § 49-808." (R., p. 11 9.) Officer Talbott
administered field sobriety tests on Colvin, then arrested and cited Colvin for
driving under the influence. (R., pp. 7-10, 119.) The state charged Colvin with
"second offense DUI." (R., p. 16.)
Colvin moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his traffic stop.
(R., pp. 52-54, 77-93, 119.) The magistrate court conducted a hearing at which

Officer Talbott testified. (R., pp. 113-14.) The magistrate admitted into evidence
Officer Talbott's dashboard video of Colvin's driving leading up to the traffic stop.
(R., p. 114; see Video, Exhibit A.) The magistrate determined that I.C. § 49-808

is not unconstitutionally vague, and that Officer Talbott initiated a lawful
investigative detention of Colvin. (R., p. 126.) The magistrate denied Colvin's
motion to suppress. (R., p. 135.)
Colvin pleaded guilty pursuant to a conditional plea agreement. (R., pp.
141-44.) Per that agreement, Colvin appealed to the district court. (R., pp. 15456.)

The district court heard oral argument and entered an appellate order

reversing the magistrate's decision. (R., pp. 208-20.) The state timely appealed.
(R., pp. 223-25.)

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it reversed and remanded the magistrate court's
order denying Colvin's motion to suppress, because the record and applicable
law, including the pertinent constitutional analysis, support the magistrate's
holding that Officer Talbott properly stopped Colvin's vehicle for violating I.C. §
49-808(1)?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Reversed And Remanded The Magistrate
Court's Order Denying Colvin's Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
In Colvin's interim appeal, the district court reversed the magistrate court's

order that denied Colvin's motion to suppress.

(R., p. 220.)

In doing so, the

district court erroneously concluded that Officer Talbott lacked legal cause to
stop Colvin's vehicle for failing to signal as required by I.C. § 49-808(1). (R., p.
220.)

Applying Idaho case law to the facts, Officer Talbott properly stopped

Colvin for violation of I.C. § 49-808(1). Moreover, under United States Supreme
Court precedent, the denial of a suppression motion is properly analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, as analyzed by the
district court below and by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Burton v. State, 149
Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010).

Applying a Fourth Amendment

analysis here, Officer Talbott had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Colvin,
thus the magistrate court correctly denied Colvin's motion to suppress.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's appellate decision.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court directly reviews a decision by a district court made in

its appellate capacity. State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142, 145, 267 P.3d 729, 732
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). The appellate court accepts the magistrate's
factual findings supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely
reviews legal conclusions. State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708, 239 P.3d 811,
813 (Ct. App. 201 0); Decker, 152 Idaho at 145, 267 P.3d at 732. Where the
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magistrate's decision is supported by the record and law, and where the district
court affirmed, the appellate court will affirm "as a matter of procedure."
C.

~

Applying State v. Dewbre, Officer Talbott Properly Stopped Colvin's
Vehicle For Failing To Signal As Required By I. C.§ 49-808(1)
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants

and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be
reasonable.

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop,

146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by
an officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is
about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203
P.3d at 1210.
"An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being
driven contrary to traffic laws." Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)). "Reasonable suspicion requires
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the
officer." State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 201 0)
(citation omitted).

Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is

evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or

4

before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210; State v.
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
Idaho Code § 49-808 governs the use of turn signals on Idaho highways
and provides, in relevant part:
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway
unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety
nor without giving an appropriate signal.
I.C. § 49-808(1). The Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed this provision in
State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999), and Burton v.
State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010). Applying those decisions
here, the district court's decision was in error.
In Dewbre, the defendant was driving on a two-lane highway when his
single lane split into two to permit passing. Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 664, 991 P.2d
at 389. At the start of the passing area, there was a sign "directing traffic to stay
to the right except to pass." 19-=. Complying with the sign, Dewbre moved his
vehicle into the right lane, then moved left when the two lanes merged back into
one. 19-=. A police officer stopped Dewbre for violation of I.C. § 49-808, and the
state charged Dewbre with driving under the influence based on evidence
gathered during the stop. lQ_,_
On appeal, Dewbre argued the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop
him under I.C. § 49-808, thus the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights . .!9-=.
at 665, 991 P.2d at 390.

Although Dewbre challenged I.C. § 49-808 as

unconstitutionally vague, the Court declined to address the issue because
Dewbre had not raised it below.

.!9-=. at 667, 991 P.3d at 392.
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The Court

determined, "[t]he language of I.C. § 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must
be given effect."

JJt

at 666, 991 P.2d at 391.

The Court noted that, upon

entering and exiting the passing area, Dewbre "moved his vehicle to the right ...
[then] moved his vehicle to the Jeff' to comply with the highway signage.

ls;L

(emphasis original). Applying the statute, the Court concluded, "I.C. § 49-808
required Dewbre to use an appropriate signal."

JJt

The Court also wrote, "[u]ntil

further clarification is provided by the Idaho legislature," I. C. § 49-808 requires an
appropriate signal "whenever a vehicle moves to the right or to the left because
one lane splits into two lanes, or two lanes merge into one lane."

&

The Idaho legislature has offered no additional guidance.

Here, as in

Dewbre, Colvin moved his vehicle to the left because two lanes merged into one
lane.

(R., pp. 118-19.)

Applying Dewbre, Officer Talbott had reasonable

suspicion that Colvin violated I.C. § 49-808, and was therefore justified in
stopping Colvin's vehicle.

D.

The Facts Here Are Distinguishable From Those In State v. Burton
In reversing the magistrate court's decision, the district court examined

Burton and determined that the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to Colvin's
case.

(R., pp. 213-20.) However, the facts in Burton are distinguishable from

Colvin's circumstance.

In Burton, the defendant was driving on a two-lane

highway "when her lane of travel expanded to include a left-hand lane to be used
only for passing." 149 Idaho at 747, 240 P.3d at 934. Burton did not enter the
passing lane, but stayed in the right-hand lane.

&

Toward the end of the

passing area, Burton "saw a traffic sign indicating 'that the lanes merged."'
6

&

Burton did not signal, and an officer stopped her car "for failure to signal before
moving 'right or left upon [the] highway"' in violation of I. C. § 49-808(1 ).

~

Breath tests showed Burton's blood alcohol content was in excess of the legal
limit, and her license was suspended.

~

Burton appealed, arguing her license

suspension should be vacated because I. C. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to her.

~at

748, 240 P.3d at 935.

The Burton Court distinguished Dewbre, noting that the "road signs and
arrows on the roadway informed [Dewbre] that the right-hand lane was ending
and that traffic must merge into the surviving, left-hand lane."

~

at 749, 240

P.3d at 936. The Court highlighted that, in Burton's case, "there is no evidence
of such signage or other indicator that one lane was ending and the other
surviving."

~

Also, the Court noted, "the statute plainly requires a signal [in

Dewbre's circumstance] because a driver in the terminating lane must change
lanes in order to continue travel on the highway, and changing lanes constitutes
a move to the left or right."

~

In contrast, Burton had "no basis to discern that

one lane [was] terminating and the other surviving," instead, her two lanes
"blend[ed] into a single lane."

~

Accordingly, it was not clear "that the

continued forward movement of a vehicle from either of the two lanes into the
emerging lane constitute[d] a 'move ... right or left' that [was] subject to the
Section 49-808(1) signal requirement."

~

Colvin's circumstance is comparable to that in Dewbre. The signage that
Colvin encountered - as encountered by Dewbre - indicated that the right lane
was ending, and the left lane was surviving. (R., p. 118.) As in Dewbre, and per
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the Court's analysis in Burton, "the statute plainly requires a signal" in Colvin's
circumstance because Colvin's lane was terminating. See Burton, 149 Idaho at
749, 240 P.3d at 936; Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 666, 991 P.2d at 391. To continue
his travel on the roadway, Colvin had to change lanes, which "constitute[d] a
move to the left."

~

Applying Dewbre, the road signs clearly indicated that

Colvin's right lane was ending and he needed to move into the surviving left lane,
thus requiring him to signal under I. C. § 49-808(1 ).
E.

Statutory Vagueness Is Not A Ground For Suppression
The United States Supreme Court has held that a constitutionally valid

seizure is not rendered invalid by a subsequent determination that the law on
which the seizure was based is unconstitutionally vague.

See Michigan v.

DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979); see also United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d
1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1999). In DeFillippo, the defendant was detained and later
arrested for violation of a Detroit municipal code, providing that it was "unlawful
for any person [suspected of criminal activity] to refuse to identify himself and
produce evidence of his identity."

~

at 33. DeFillippo was searched and later

charged with possession of a controlled substance found during that search.
at 34.

~

DeFillippo moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search,

which the trial court denied.

~

The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, and

after the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted the state's petition for certiorari.

~at

34-35. The U.S. Supreme

Court concluded the motion to suppress was properly denied and reversed the
Michigan Court of Appeals' decision.

~

at 40.
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The Court in DeFillippo found, "On this record there was abundant
probable cause to satisfy the constitutional prerequisite for an arrest."

~

at 37.

The Court also found that, at the time, "there was no controlling precedent that
this ordinance was or was not constitutional, and hence the conduct observed
violated a presumptively valid ordinance."

~

"Police are charged to enforce

laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional."

~

at 38.

"Society

would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to determine
which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement."

~

The Court held, "The subsequently determined invalidity of the Detroit ordinance
on vagueness grounds does not undermine the validity of the arrest made for
violation of that ordinance, and the evidence discovered in the search of
respondent should not have been suppressed."

~

at 40. In other words, for

purposes of suppression, it is immaterial that DeFillippo's arrest was for violation
of an ordinance later deemed void for vagueness.

~;

see also Dexter, 165 F.3d

at 1125.
The district court relied on the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in Burton
to hold that suppression was the correct remedy for Colvin's vagueness
challenge. (R., pp. 218-19.) However, such a holding conflicts with the holding
in DeFillippo. In Burton, the Court concluded that I. C. § 49-808(1) was
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton. Burton, 149 Idaho at 748-49, 240
P.3d at 935-36.

The Burton Court reasoned that I.C. § 49-808(1) failed to

provide sufficient notice that "a signal is required when two lanes blend into one."
~

As already discussed, the facts under which the statute was deemed vague
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as applied to Burton distinguish Burton from Dewbre and from Colvin's case. 1
On those facts, the Burton Court concluded, "no legal cause existed to effectuate
the traffic stop that led to her breath tests." Burton, 149 Idaho at 750, 240 P.3d
at 937. However, the Court in Burton employed no Fourth Amendment analysis. 2
See id. Moreover, the Court cited no authority for the proposition that the remedy
for the statute's vagueness is suppression of evidence. See id.
The issue here, as in Burton, is whether evidence obtained from the traffic
stop- for violation of I. C. § 49-808- should be suppressed. A determination that
I. C. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague would warrant dismissal of a charge for

failing to signal a lane change under that provision.
purposes of suppression,

But under DeFillippo, for

it is immaterial whether I. C.

§ 49-808(1) is

unconstitutionally vague as applied to Colvin. Given the facts here, I. C. § 49-808
is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Colvin. But even if it were, a court's
finding as such would not undermine the validity of Officer Talbott's detention of
Colvin for violating I.C. § 49-808.

To the extent Burton conflicts with that

analysis, DeFillippo controls. Applying DeFillippo and the facts in Colvin's case,
Officer Talbott had a constitutionally adequate basis to stop Colvin for violating

1

As in Dewbre, Colvin's duty to signal was triggered because the road sign
clearly indicated his right lane would end, and the left lane would remain. The
magistrate's findings included a picture of the sign that Colvin encountered,
directing traffic to merge to the left. (R., p. 118.) Because the road sign clearly
alerted Colvin that he needed to move from his lane on the right to the surviving
left lane, too holding in Burton does not apply.
2
Given the facts in Burton, it appears that application of a Fourth Amendment
analysis may have yielded the same result: because two lanes blended into one
without signage indicating which lane ended and which remained, the officer may
have lacked reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton changed lanes without
signaling.
10

I. C. § 49-808. (See R., pp. 117-19.) Accordingly, the magistrate's order denying

Colvin's motion to suppress was correct, and the district court's opinion and order
is in error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
appellate decision and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2014.

Deputy Attorney General
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